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ABSTRACT
Recent evidence suggests that popular disaffection with liberal-
democratic norms and institutions has been growing in different
regions of the world, but studying the social origins of democratic
versus authoritarian political preferences are especially relevant in
countries with immature democratic practices. The main concern
of this article is the association between intergenerational social
mobility and support for democracy in post-socialist societies. I
present a theoretical framework in which individuals’ political
attitudes are affected by their intergenerational social mobility
experiences. I model this theoretical argument using two
complementary data-sets and various multivariable and multilevel
statistical techniques. The results indicate that intergenerational
social mobility, particularly its subjective perception, has
statistically significant links with attitudes towards democracy and
that this association is moderated by the attained level of
democracy in the country where an individual resides. This may
suggest that studying social origins of support for democracy by
means of intergenerational social mobility can be an important
tool to understand the conundrum of democratisation and
democratic backsliding in post-socialist societies.
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Intergenerational social mobility is the process where individual socio-economic standings
in adult life represents a movement away from their parents’ socio-economic position.
Some of the most influential social scientists suggested that intergenerational social mobi-
lity can facilitate social stability and integration into the political system, whereas down-
ward mobility – or simply stability of marginalised groups – is expected to foster
radicalism and political alienation among individuals. De Tocqueville (1835) in his
‘Democracy in America’ argued that in traditional societies all citizens occupy social pos-
itions that are fixed across generations, while in democratic nations some individuals and
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their families are rising up and others falling down the social ladder. Sorokin (1956), com-
piling data on upward mobility of the monarchs and presidents of different countries, sta-
ted that democratic societies are often characterised with more intensive upward mobility
compared with non-democratic ones. More recently, Houle (2019), using data for more
than 100 countries worldwide, empirically demonstrated that social mobility levels are
positively associated with political stability.
If intergenerational social mobility affects attitudes towards the political system then
existing regimes might, at least partially, derive their legitimacy by providing opportunities
for intergenerational social mobility to their citizens through policies improving individ-
uals’ life chances (Acemoglu et al., 2018; Leventoglu, 2005, 2014). Nonetheless, it is still
unclear what individuals who experience upward or downward social mobility think of
the political regime in which they live. In this article, I enquire into the association of inter-
generational social mobility and support for democracy, which, at minimum, can be
understood as individuals’ support for a system of government where the citizens exercise
power by voting in free and fair elections. Although recent evidence suggests that popular
disaffection with liberal-democratic norms and institutions has been growing in different
regions of the world (Foa & Mounk, 2017; Széll, 2018), studying the implications of social
mobility for democratic versus authoritarian political preferences are especially relevant in
post-socialist societies. These countries experienced radical change and inherited specific
social mobility patterns vis-à-vis the previous authoritarian regimes with their forceful de-
stratifying policies (Gugushvili, 2017b; Jackson & Evans, 2017). However, we do not know
much about the concrete implications of upward or downward mobility for individuals in
these societies. Studying the links between social mobility and freely expressed political
attitudes was clearly problematic in the socialist context, because political, economic
and civil society activities were severely restricted, if not completely blocked.
There is an extensive literature on the process of democratisation, which has impli-
cations for our understanding of post-socialist political transitions. The most influential
theoretical perspectives on democratisation focus on macro-level determinants such as
economic development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000) and the distribution of resources
(Boix, 2003), but they also imply that mass support for a democratic political regime
underlies the process of democratisation. Welzel and Inglehart (2008), for instance,
argue that in one of the most important waves of democratisation since the end of the
1980s, struggle for democracy, in socieites as different as South Korea, Indonesia, and
East Germany, was not primarily about economic welfare and income inequality but
rather about political equality. Support for democracy in a society is considered as a
vital component of democratic consolidation because it prevents authoritarian political
forces to seize power through electoral cycles and various types of revolutions (Hegre
et al., 2001; Welzel & Inglehart, 2005).
There is a large scholarship on democratic perceptions in post-socialist societies and
various aspects attached to democracy such as human rights, civil society and authoritar-
ian leadership (e.g. Colton & Mcfaul, 2002; Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Gugushvili &
Kabachnik, 2019; Hale, 2011; McAllister &White, 2017; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Gugushvili
et al., 2016). Describing post-socialist societies, Lipset (1994), one of the leading political
sociologists of the twentieth century, argued that ‘the success of democracy in these
countries depends in large part on their populations’ ability to adapt to freedom, to
break away from their former views on the role of the state’ (p. 13). From an
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individual-level perspective studies generally find that democracy in post-socialist
countries is negatively perceived by unemployed, objectively and subjectively deprived,
retired and less-educated respondents, while from a macro-level point of view, conditions
such as low GDP per capita and income inequality levels affect support for newly estab-
lished democratic institutions (Andersen, 2012; Gibson, 1996; Hayo, 2004; Kluegel &
Mason, 2004; Linos &West, 2003; Pacek, 1994). To my knowledge, the role of intergenera-
tional social mobility in attitudes towards an emerging post-socialist political system has
not been systematically and comparatively explored.
In this study I intend to answer two related research questions: Are there statistically
significant differences in attitudes towards the political system between intergenerationally
mobile and non-mobile individuals? And, how does the attained level of democracy com-
paratively moderate the role of social mobility in attitudes towards the political system?
The empirical evidence on the effect of intergenerational social mobility experience on
various political attitudes is scarce, dated, and inconclusive (Blau, 1956; Daenekindt
et al., 2018; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2000; Sorokin, 1956; Weakliem, 1992). In this study, how-
ever, I will argue that, unlike the previous research which mostly deals with voting behav-
iour and left-right cleavages within the established democratic environment, the
consequences of intergenerational social mobility on political attitudes can be more rel-
evant to support for democracy in post-socialist societies.
The argument
Self-interest, middle class, and support for democracy
There are several reasons why the experience of intergenerational upward or downward
mobility might be relevant to support for democracy. All post-socialist countries began
formal transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political order between 1989
and 1991. Unlike situations where links between mobility and attitudes are researched
in relation to specific social and economic policies, as well as concrete political parties, atti-
tudinal preferences among the socially mobile during and after transition are more likely
to be related to the broad macro-structural changes. In comparison to non-mobile social
groups, upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals have more reason to support or
oppose the political system as it affects their current socio-economic status. Studies of
post-socialist societies, for instance, show that attitudes towards the political system are
based on perceptions that the system is open and fair and provides opportunities to every-
one, while the perception of social inequality is positively associated with support for
‘strong-hand’ authoritarian government (Whitefield & Loveless, 2013).
The role of self-interest in shaping attitudes of political nature has been extensively
researched (e.g. Barnes, 2015; Linos & West, 2003). However, it is still not clear what
type of political system is most desirable for socially mobile individuals. In some post-
socialist countries, small groups of people managed to succeed in transitional economic
reforms (Titma & Roots, 2006). The systems within which these individuals operated typi-
cally were not full-fledged democracies. A significant share of their populations experi-
enced downward mobility (Gerber & Hout, 2004; Gugushvili, 2017a). Downwardly and
upwardly mobile individuals are likely to, at least partially, blame or support emerging sys-
tems, democratic or authoritarian, for personal failures and successes. The self-interest
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thesis implies that support for either democracy or autocracy depends on which regime is
likely to deliver the policies which serve the utility of upwardly or downwardly mobile
individuals. A baseline economic self-interest view suggests that, given their interest in
preserving attained gains, the upwardly mobile are primarily interested in the regime
that best delivers ‘political order.’ Since political order may be a characteristic of either
democracies or autocracies, the ‘economic view’ is alone insufficient to explain support
for either democracy or authoritarianism.
Among various alternative perspectives on socio-economic foundations of democ-
racy, the democratic transition literature in the political economy tradition probably
most appropriately explains political preferences of intergenerationally mobile individ-
uals in post-socialist societies. This approach implies that democratic transition and its
sustainability require the existence of a strong ‘middle class’ which demands increased
political participation (Przeworski et al., 2000). Assuming that intergenerational upward
mobility is a pre-requisite of middle-class expansion, we can expect that, on average,
upwardly mobile individuals would prefer a democratic political order. This thinking
is also corroborated by insights from social psychology suggesting that people are
more likely to attribute failure to factors that are beyond their control and more likely
to explain successes by pointing to their own merits, abilities and effort (Miller & Ross,
1975). If we assume that individuals’ attitudes towards the political system in post-
socialist societies are affected by life-long experiences, then their initial set of attitudes
are amended over the years based on their experience of intergenerational social mobi-
lity and an associated perception of the role ascribed and attained factors play in deter-
mining downward or upward mobility (Gugushvili, 2016a, 2016b). Although
democracies do not necessarily guarantee good governance and high human well-
being, the nature of democracy implies that democratic societies are more open and
people have more opportunities to shape their lives than countries with authoritarian
political regimes (Rothstein, 2018).
Type of regime and support for democracy in comparative perspective
Building on the framework presented above, we still cannot expect that upward social
mobility has an outright positive effect on attitudes about a new and emerging political
system, and there are reasons to believe that the strength of these links varies in different
countries. It has been argued that high levels of social mobility may in fact facilitate the
stability of a regime via middle-class or lower-class behaviour, but stagnant upward mobi-
lity or the threat of downward mobility among the middle class creates incentives that
facilitate democratic transition (Leventoglu, 2005). In the latter scenario, the existing
regime could try to sustain the autocracy by providing the lower classes with more oppor-
tunities for social mobility, which in turn makes it less likely that they will support a demo-
cratic transition. The opposite applies to democratic environments in which increased
opportunities for upward social mobility among the lower classes create weaker incentives
to support autocratic tendencies, while a democratic transition accompanied by prolonged
high levels of intergenerational downward mobility and too much erosion of such a
‘middle class’ will likely lead to dissatisfaction with democracy (Leventoglu, 2014). In
this scenario, individuals would prefer the old regime, or some variant of authoritarianism,
to restore their former status.
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Based on the described framework, people who had opportunities of moving up in the
social hierarchy of post-socialist authoritarianism may exhibit strong attachment to pre-
existing social and political orders and tend to reject support for democracy. It seems
reasonable to expect the emergence of a ‘cult of gratitude’ among the upwardly mobile
individuals who will be more likely to support the existing political system that allowed
them to succeed by providing them with increased life chances (Jackman, 1972). There-
fore, I expect that attitudes towards the political system are affected by the existing level
of democracy within a given society. To reiterate, the argument here is that people are
more likely to associate their success not only with equality of opportunities, as such,
but with the existing system – no matter how democratic. In other words, when people
rise to the top of the social hierarchy and maintain this position, the experience likely cre-
ates strong attachment to the society that provided them with increased life chances, not to
abstract political notions or concepts (Kelley, 1992). In this vein, support for democracy
among upwardly mobile individuals will be stronger in more democratically advanced
post-socialist countries, while authoritarian rule might be preferable among the upwardly
mobile in less democratic post-socialist countries.
Patterns of democratisation in post-socialist societies
Post-socialist societies are significantly different from each other by the levels and types of
democracy they have achieved and this provides an opportunity to explore the main
research question of this article in comparative perspective. Transitional societies in
post-socialist Europe can be divided in several territorial, cultural and geopolitical sub-
groups, which also reflect the democratisation trends in these countries. The most demo-
cratically advanced post-socialist societies are Central and Eastern European new EU
member countries. Existing evidence suggests that, among other factors, the process of
EU accession itself contributed to democratic advances particularly in the least developed
countries such as Bulgaria and Romania (Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012). Three Baltic
States – Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia – have diverged with their democratisation paths
from other former Soviet republics since gaining independence in 1991. Although they
have experienced significant advances towards full democratisation, Latvia and Estonia
due to their multi-ethnic population compositions struggled to balance ethnic pluralism,
nation building, and democracy (Duvold & Berglund, 2014).
The group of Balkan countries generally made progress towards democratisation since
the 1990s, but this group also consists of severely war-torn societies characterised by con-
siderable variance of democratic practices (Grimm & Mathis, 2018). The group of non-
Baltic former Soviet Union republics consists of countries in Central Asia and South Cau-
casus as well as Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. These countries are the least demo-
cratic among other post-socialist societies. The so called ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the early 2000s generated hopes for an accelerated process of
democratisation throughout the former Soviet Union, but these revolutions in fact pro-
voked autocrats in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and other post-Soviet
countries to strengthen domestic efforts to pre-empt challenges related to democratisation
processes (Silitski, 2010). The recent comparative analysis of the Regime Legitimation
Expert Survey suggests that one of the mechanisms through which the authoritarian rulers
in these countries maintain power is their legitimating claim that they represent the
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guardians of citizens’ socio-economic well-being (Soest & Grauvogel, 2016). The latter
relates to the main thesis of this study that support for a political regime by socially mobile
individuals is conditioned by the level of attained democracy in post-socialist countries.
In sum, based on the proposed theoretical framework, in the empirical part of this
article I test the following hypothesis: Intergenerational upward (downward) mobility is
positively (negatively) linked with support for democracy but this association is primarily
manifest in countries with high levels of democratic attainment.
Research design
Data-sets
European Values Studies (EVS) and Life in Transition Survey (LITS), respectively con-
ducted in 2008 and 2010, provide an opportunity to study the link between intergenera-
tional social mobility and support for democracy in post-socialist societies. EVS is
employed to look at links between intergenerational mobility in occupational status and
support for democracy; LITS in turn provides information on subjective perception of
intergenerational mobility and allows investigating if the latter is associated with support
for democracy. Both in EVS and LITS face-to-face interviews were conducted using repre-
sentative, multi-stage (or stratified) random samples of the adult populations in the fol-
lowing 21 countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine.1 After list-
wise deletion of missing data and censoring individuals below age of 25, the sample
sizes for multivariable analysis are 14,657 and 19,073 individuals in EVS and LITS,
respectively.2
Dependent variables
In EVS, the dependent variable on attitudes towards the political system comes from the
question that asks respondents whether they ‘disagree strongly’ = 1, ‘disagree’ = 2, ‘agree’
= 3 or ‘agree strongly’ = 4 that ‘democracy may have problems but it is better than any
other form of government.’ Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample indicate that sup-
port for the idea that democracy is better than any other form of government is strong
with a mean value of 3.14 (SD 0.68). The categorical distribution of responses is presented
in Figure 1. It is clear that only a minority of respective populations disagree that democ-
racy is better than any other form of government, but differences within the countries are
also obvious (Table s1 in online supplementary materials). The new EU member
countries, both Central and Eastern European and Baltic societies, expressed the lowest
support for democracy among other post-socialist regions. In sensitivity tests of the
main results, I also analyse alternative dependent variables on democracy which are avail-
able in the employed data-set.
For the dependent variable in LITS, respondents are asked to choose one of the three
following options: (1) ‘democracy is preferable to any other form of political system,’ (2)
‘for people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritar-
ian,’ (3) ‘under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a
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democratic one.’ The distribution of answers for the pooled sample in Figure 1 indicates
that half of the respondents agreed that democracy is preferable to any other form of gov-
ernment, while only one fifth of respondents agreed that an authoritarian form of govern-
ment may be preferable under some circumstances. Support for democracy is highest in
the Former Soviet Union and lowest in the Baltic States.3
Independent variables
The main explanatory variable employed in this article is intergenerational social mobility
experienced and reported by respondents. EVS gives information about the Standard
International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom & Trei-
man, 1996) which varies from 16 to 90. To operationalise social mobility in occupational
status, I divide both respondents and their parents into the bottom, middle, and top tertiles
of occupational status attainment (Gugushvili et al., 2017). Table 1 shows all possible
mobility trajectories and suggests that most individuals do not experience intergenera-
tional upgrades in occupational status. I coded those respondents who moved from the
middle to the bottom and from the top to the middle tertiles as downwardly mobile,
while those respondents who moved from the top to the bottom tertile are coded as
strongly downwardly mobile. I apply the reverse order for the upper end of intergenera-
tional mobility. It is noticeable that only a minority of respondents experienced strong
upward and strong downward mobility in occupational status.
In LITS, respondents are asked to compare their parents’ position to their own by
agreeing or disagreeing with the following statement: ‘I have done better in life than my
Figure 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables, distribution of valid answers,
%. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EVS (2010) and EBRD (2010).
Table 1. Operationalisation of intergenerational mobility in occupational status.
Respondents
Parents Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile
Bottom tertile 1→1 Non-mobile: 17.7% 1→2: Upward: 12.4% 1→3: Strongly upward: 8.2%
Middle tertile 2→1 Downward: 10.6% 2→2: Non-mobile: 11.7% 2→3: Upward: 9.4%
Top tertile 3→1 Strongly downward: 5.7% 3→2: Downward: 9.3% 3→3: Non-mobile: 15.0%
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EVS (2010).
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parents.’ I transform the answers from this question into five categorical variables:
‘strongly disagree’ = strongly downwardly mobile, ‘disagree’ = downwardly mobile,
‘neither disagree nor agree’ = non-mobile, ‘agree’ = upwardly mobile and ‘strongly agree’
= strongly upwardly mobile. The main characteristic of this indicator of intergenerational
mobility in post-socialist context is that it does not necessarily imply social mobility in
terms of educational, occupational, or income mobility. It can also reflect the structural
upgrade or downgrade of the economy, e.g. collective mobility (Gugushvili, in press).
But when the answers on subjective intergenerational mobility are contrasted with indi-
viduals’ perceptions on how well they have done in life when compared with their high
school classmates and colleagues (measuring collective mobility), subjective intergenera-
tional mobility still maintains unique variations and therefore can serve as an alternative
indicator of objective intergenerational mobility (Zaidi et al., 2009).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of occupational and perceived intergenerational mobi-
lity in the pooled sample of post-socialist societies. The main difference between the
depicted frequencies is that a much higher share of individuals are intergenerationally
non-mobile in terms of occupational mobility, while significantly more individuals declare
that they have experienced upward mobility than is observed for mobility in occupational
status. The frequencies for separate countries (shown in Table s2 in online supplementary
materials) also suggest that cross-national differences are more vividly pronounced in sub-
jective rather than objective occupational mobility.
Control variables
I employ an array of socio-demographic variables that are expected to associate with the
dependent variables: gender; marriage, age and age of respondents squared and divided by
100; the highest level of completed education is based on the 1997 version of International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which varies from ISCED 0 (pre-primary
education) to ISCED 6 (second stage of tertiary education); I created dummy variables
for the following types of labour market status: employed, unemployed, students, retired,
and an ‘other’ category which includes homemakers, disabled people, those who do not
want to work, have no need to work, or cannot find suitable jobs.
In addition to the described variables which are identical in EVS and LITS, I also
account for survey specific comparable controls. In EVS, type of settlement is accounted
for with the size of the population in a respondents’ location, while in LITS type of settle-
ment is given with urban vs. rural residency. For respondents’ socio-economic status, in
EVS, I control for monthly household income, while in LITS, respondents were asked
to place their households on a ten-step hierarchical ladder. In EVS, I account for the indi-
viduals’ tertiles of occupational status, while in LITS, respondents’ occupational attain-
ment is classified with the 1958 version of the International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO). I operationalise the following major categories: white collar occu-
pations, unskilled service occupations, agricultural workers and minors, and manual
workers. Lastly, in both data-sets I account for parental education. In EVS, the mean of
parental education is given as an ISCED variable, while in LITS parental education is
years of educational attainment which I divide in three groups: 0–5 years, 6–11, and 12
years or more (for descriptive statistics refer to Table s3 in online supplementary
materials).
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Macro-level variables
I employ macro-level data for 2008 and 2010 for EVS and LITS, respectively. The
measure of democracy used in this article is the democracy index of the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) (EIU, 2010). The EIU index of democracy values vary from
0 = no democracy to 10 = absolute democracy. In the pooled sample of post-socialist
societies, the mean value of this index slightly decreased from 6.4–6.1 in 2008–2010
(Kekic, 2007). Non-Baltic former Soviet Union republics clearly lag behind by the
level of democratic reforms (4.7), while all EU member countries on average score
much higher (7.3).
The level of economic development is measured by GDP per capita based on purchas-
ing power parity (PPP). Data are in constant 2005 international dollars and are derived
from the World Bank’s (2017) World Development Indicators (WDI) database. As the
consequence of the economic crisis in the end of the 2000s, the mean value GDP ppp
per capita decreased from 15,191 in 2008 to 14,828 in 2010. There are also clear differences
in economic development between the former Soviet Union (USD 9,701) and other EU
member countries (USD 20,491). I use standardised contextual variables in regression
models (actual values for separate countries are shown in Table s4 in online supplemen-
tary materials).
Methods
I start multivariable analysis by fitting generalised ordered and multinomial logistic
regressions. The ordinal form of the dependent variable in EVS permits the estimation
of simple ordered logistic regression, but the conducted Brant Test indicated that in the
parallel-lines model assumption was violated for a number of independent variables.
Instead, the maximum-likelihood generalised ordered logit model was used which
relaxes the proportional odds assumption and allows the effects of the independent
variables to vary across ordered categories of the dependent variable (Williams,
2006). On the other hand, the nominal nature of the outcome variable in LITS allows
fitting multinomial logistic regression. For both EVS and LITS, the following equation
is the general regression specification applied for estimating the role of intergenera-
tional social mobility in attitudes towards democracy where i indicates individual
respondents,
∑
dXik represents control variables and country fixed-effects, while ε
depicts the error term:
Support for democracyi = g0 + g1Strongly upwardi + g2Upwardi + g3Downwardi
+ g4Strongly downwardi +
∑
dXik + 1i (1)
To estimate how macro contextual factors moderate the association between interge-
nerational social mobility and support for democracy, I employ a multilevel regression
technique (Hox, 2002). It consists of level one individual analysis, level two country
contextual characteristics of democracy and economic development, and the cross-
level interactions of level two variables with intergenerational mobility in occupational
status and subjective perception of mobility. These interaction terms indicate how con-
textual variables moderate the relationship between social mobility and support for
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democracy. Equation 2 formally outlines the applied analytical strategy.
Support for democracyij =g0 + g1Strongly upwardij + g2Upwardij + g3Downwardij
+ g4Strongly downwardij +
∑
dXik + 1ij + f1Democracyj




× (f1Democracyj + f2Economic developmentj))+ U0j.
(2)
Where U0j represents the random component for the intercept (γ0). To simplify analy-
sis and the interpretation of results in multilevel models, I transform both dependent vari-
ables in binary form (in EVS ‘agree strongly’ that ‘democracy is better than any other form
of government’ = 1 and in LITS ‘democracy is preferable’ = 1) and run multilevel mixed-
effects logistic regressions with maximum likelihood estimators using ‘xtmelogit’ com-
mand in Stata 15 statistical package.
Results
Bivariate associations and multivariable analysis
I first present bivariate associations between intergenerational social mobility and support
for democracy. The results in Figure 2 indicate that if there is any relationship between
objective social mobility and democratic preferences then it is weak. Those who experience
strong upward mobility have marginally stronger preferences for democracy than non-
mobile individuals. It is important to remember that the bivariate associations do not
account for country differences or various socio-demographic variables that are expected
to affect support for democracy. Figure 2 also illustrates the links between subjective per-
ception of intergenerational mobility and political system preferences. It is evident that
Figure 2. Occupational/perception of intergenerational social mobility and attitudes towards demo-
cratic political system, distribution of valid answers, %. Source: Author’s calculations based on data
from EVS (2010) and EBRD (2010).
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fewer individuals who have experienced downward mobility believe that democracy is pre-
ferable to any other form of political system. On the other hand, the majority of upwardly
mobile people agree with the latter assertion.
In Table 2, I run generalised ordered logistic regression for intergenerational mobility
in occupational status and multinomial logistic regression for subjective perception of
intergenerational mobility (see Table s5 in online supplementary materials for full results
with control variables). Before describing the main results, it is important to explain how
to interpret relative risk ratios (RRRs) in generalised ordered logistic regression. The first
panel in Model 1 contrasts the answer option ‘disagree strongly’ which has a value of 1
with answer options (2) ‘disagree’, (3) ‘agree’, and (4) ‘agree strongly’. The last panel in
turn contrasts the first three answer options ‘disagree strongly’, ‘disagree’, and ‘agree’
with the last answer option ‘agree strongly’. The same logic applies to Panel 2 which is
located in between.
The output of the generalised ordered logistic regression indicates that objective inter-
generational mobility does not have a statistically significant association with support for
democracy. The systemic and statistically significant associations are revealed, however,
between subjective perception of intergenerational mobility and the dependent variable.
Both the upward and strongly upward mobile individuals tend to agree with the idea
that democracy is preferable to any other form of political system. These two groups of
individuals are 1.33 (SE 0.07) and 1.34 (SE 0.09) times more likely to support democracy
than non-mobile individuals. Thus, in the multivariable analysis, I find no association
between objective intergenerational mobility and attitudes toward democracy, though per-
ceived social mobility in the upward direction is significantly and positively associated
with preferences for democracy.
Table 2. Occupational/perception of intergenerational mobility and attitudes toward democratic
political system, RRRs from generalised ordered logistic (M1) and multinomial logistic (M2) regressions
M1: Objective mobility M2: Subjective mobility




















1.36 (0.44) 1.11 (0.14) 1.00 (0.10) 0.89 (0.06) 0.86 (0.07)
Downward 0.86 (0.14) 0.96 (0.07) 1.04 (0.06) 1.01 (0.06) 1.05 (0.07)
Upward 1.04 (0.19) 0.88 (0.06) 0.98 (0.05) 1.33 (0.07)*** 0.98 (0.06)
Strongly
upward






Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 levels. Robust standard errors are in parenth-
eses. Models account for control variables and country fixed-effects. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EVS
(2010) and LITS (EBRD, 2010).
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Table 3. Occupational/perception of intergenerational mobility, contextual variables and support for democracy, ORs from multilevel mixed-effects logistic
regression models.
I. Objective intergenerational mobility II. Subjective intergenerational mobility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mobility
Strongly downward 0.87 (0.08) 0.98 (0.12) 0.81 (0.11) 0.94 (0.06) 0.94 (0.06) 0.91 (0.06)
Downward 0.95 (0.05) 0.95 (0.07) 0.89 (0.07) 0.98 (0.05) 0.99 (0.05) 0.96 (0.05)
Upward 1.02 (0.05) 1.02 (0.07) 0.96 (0.08) 1.34 (0.06)*** 1.35 (0.06)*** 1.34 (0.06)***
Strongly upward 1.05 (0.07) 1.01 (0.10) 1.03 (0.11) 1.31 (0.08)*** 1.32 (0.08)*** 1.30 (0.08)***
Macro-level variables
Stand. democracy index 0.85 (0.06)* – 0.95 (0.08) 0.81(0.08)* – 0.85 (0.10)
Stand. GDP PPP per capita – 0.76 (0.07)** 0.79 (0.09)* – 0.83 (0.08)* 0.90 (0.10)
Cross-level interactions
Strongly downward*democracy 0.80 (0.07)** – 0.77 (0.08)** 1.09 (0.08) – 1.26 (0.12)*
Downward*democracy 0.95 (0.05) – 0.91 (0.06) 1.17 (0.06)** – 1.31 (0.09)***
Upward*democracy 0.95 (0.05) – 0.92 (0.05) 1.07 (0.05) – 1.11 (0.06)
Strongly upward*democracy 1.04 (0.07) – 1.03 (0.09) 1.28 (0.08)*** – 1.26 (0.09)**
Strongly downward*GDP – 0.88 (0.10) 1.10 (0.16) – 0.91 (0.06) 0.81 (0.07)*
Downward* GDP – 1.01 (0.06) 1.09 (0.09) – 0.97 (0.05) 0.84 (0.05)**
Upward* GDP – 1.00 (0.06) 1.08 (0.09) – 1.00 (0.04) 0.94 (0.05)
Strongly upward* GDP – 1.05 (0.09) 1.02 (0.11) – 1.18 (0.07)** 1.05 (0.07)
Random intercept 0.32 (0.05) 0.31 (0.05) 0.29 (0.05) 0.42 (0.07) 0.39 (0.06) 0.40 (0.06)
Statistics
AIC 16,997 17,003 17,002 23,354 23,357 23,345
BIC 17,201 17,208 17,245 23,603 23,606 23,634
Observations 14,480 14,480 14,480 17,822 17,822 17,822
Countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, and 0.05 levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.







































In Table 3, I fit the multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models with contextual vari-
ables and their cross-level interaction terms in order to observe if the level of democracy
moderates the association between intergenerational mobility and the dependent vari-
ables. Regarding intergenerational mobility in occupational status, the interaction term
of the EIU democracy index and strong downward mobility maintains statistical signifi-
cance both in Model 1 with odds ratio of 0.80 (SE 0.07) and in Model 3 with odds ratio
of 0.77 (SE 0.08). The results are in line with my expectation that downwardly mobile indi-
viduals in more democratic societies are less enthusiastic about the democratic political
system. The interaction term between the level of democracy and strong upward mobility
is also statistically significant for subjective mobility with odds ratio of 1.26 (SE 0.09) in
Model 3. At the same time, however, when economic development and its interaction
term with intergenerational mobility are accounted for, the interaction effects between
democracy and downward mobility are also positive and significant. Nonetheless, control-
ling for the attained level of democracy, support for democracy among downwardly
mobile individuals is weaker in more economically developed societies. The latter suggests
that downwardly mobile individuals are less likely to prefer the democratic political system
when their countries achieve the comparatively high level of economic prosperity.
Finally, to reveal how specific values of EIU index of democracy are associated with
support of democracy, Figure 3 depicts marginal effects from strong downward mobility
in occupational status and the perception of strong upward mobility on support for
democracy. The interpretation of the results is straightforward – the interaction terms
are significant if the 95% confidence intervals do not cross the horizontal zero line. For
occupational intergenerational mobility, the higher values of the index of democracy
decrease the marginal effects of strong downward mobility on democratic preferences,
but these associations become statistically significant only when EUI democracy index
reaches more than 7.0 in countries such as Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland or Latvia. In these
Figure 3. Occupational/perception of intergenerational social mobility, the EUI democracy index and
support for democracy.
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EVS (2010), EBRD
(2010) and EIU (2010).
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countries, strongly downwardly mobile individuals are about 10% less likely to agree that
democracy is better than any other form of government. The effect of democracy on the
links between intergenerational subjective mobility and support for democracy is more
obvious for perceived mobility. In countries with the highest democracy scores such as
Slovenia and Czech Republic strong upward mobility leads to about 15% stronger support
for democracy, while in countries with a democracy score of less than 5.0 such as Armenia,
Georgia or Russia upward social mobility is not associated with greater democratic
preferences.
Robustness of findings
In online supplementary materials, I further check if the derived results hold when I fit
statistical models with different specifications. First, in models on occupational and sub-
jective intergenerational mobility I control for only those variables which are identical in
EVS and LITS (Table s6). Second, to simultaneously account for the effects stemming from
individuals’ origins and destinations, I analyse how far specific mobility trajectories are
associated with support for democracy by calculating post-estimation predicted probabil-
ities for individuals in all possible trajectories of occupational mobility (Figure s1). Third, I
employ alternative dependent variables on democracy from EVS which enquires into
respondents’ attitudes towards economic development and maintaining order in a demo-
cratic political system (Table s7). Finally, instead of fitting generalised ordered logistic
regressions, I run alternative model specifications with separate linear probability models
for each outcome in the dependent variable (Tables s8 and s9). These tests confirm that
objectively mobile individuals are not statistically different in their support for democracy
when compared with non-mobile individuals; subjectively upwardly mobile individuals
still think that democracy is preferable to any other form of political system, while the
level of democracy maintains its moderating effect.
Discussion and conclusions
In this article, I attempted to determine whether intergenerational social mobility has any
links to public perceptions of the legitimacy of democracy. Although the research frame-
work intended to contribute to the general understanding of the social bases of support for
democracy, this question is especially relevant and under-explored in post-socialist tran-
sition societies. Earlier research, which mainly concentrated on the Western European
countries, looked at the implications of social mobility on more specific components of
political action such as individual voting patterns (e.g. Graaf et al., 1995; Paterson,
2008; Weakliem, 1992). In my analysis, I used the broader variables on attitudes towards
democracy, which I hypothesised to have significant links with intergenerational social
mobility.
In the theoretical framework, I argued that upwardly mobile individuals have positive
perceptions of the emerging democratic system, while downwardly mobile individuals
have negative perceptions of democracy; and both of these associations should be primar-
ily observed in countries with already high levels of democratic development. This reason-
ing is mainly based on an assumption those individuals who experienced upward mobility,
or simply maintained an advantageous social status during post-socialist transition would
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favour emerging institutions no matter how democratic or authoritarian these institutions
were. In addition, I also assumed that, despite its many shortcomings, democracies are
more open and people have more opportunities to shape their lives than they do in
countries with authoritarian political regimes, and this is one of the reasons why upwardly
mobile individuals would prefer democratic political order. Using both an objective occu-
pational indicator and the subjective perception of intergenerational mobility from EVS
and LITS and attitudes towards democracy as dependent variables, I found that when
the level of democracy in countries of respondents’ residence is not accounted for, inter-
generational mobility in occupational status is not significantly associated with support for
democracy. Nonetheless, this association in terms of subjective perception of intergenera-
tional social mobility is statistically significant.
Finding the significant association between perceived upward mobility and support for
democracy regardless of the type of regime in which individuals reside suggests that inter-
generational mobility is associated with democratic preferences even if upwardly mobile
individuals did not live under democracy or directly benefited from it. As mentioned in
the research framework section, some evidence exists that an upward mobility experience
likely generates the perception that success in life is determined by hard work, effort, skills
and intelligence, while the experience of downward mobility is likely to create an opposite
worldview – that life chances are conditioned by social injustice in society (Schmidt, 2011).
If the latter is the case, intergenerationally mobile persons’ perceptions might be that
democracy is a political system in which individuals have a greater control over their
lives. Democracies undoubtedly provide better possibilities for winning elections for
any individuals who run for political office on local, regional, national levels than do
strictly controlled or rigged ballots (Collins, 2004). In the social stratification literature
it is well known that minority groups are often socially less mobile (Heath, 2007), while
in democratic societies minority viewpoints are more likely to be respected, individuals
enjoy more personal freedoms and people are less likely to be discriminated against
based on their ethnicity. Further, gender equality, right to travel, choice of work and
study are more likely to be the norm in democracies than in autocracies – all of which
could have an effect on intergenerational social mobility.
One of the caveats of the finding that subjectively upwardly mobile individuals have
higher support for democracy than non-mobile individuals, regardless of political context,
is that there are many reasons why respondents may feel they are doing better than their
parents; such as the general standards of living, family trajectories, and adverse life course
outcomes which are not adequately accounted for by the employed control variables in my
regression models. The very fact that most of the parents of survey respondents lived
under socialism while the survey respondents did not may be a decisive factor in shaping
whether respondents perceive they are better or worse off than their parents, and in a man-
ner that could be endogenous to perceptions of the current political regime. Respondents
who think that democracy fuels disorder and uncertainty may feel they are worse off than
their parents because their parents lived in a socialist system, while those who associate
democracy instead with freedom from censorship and oppression and more opportunity
for individual expression and advancement may feel better off than their parents for the
same reason.
Based on the theoretical framework, it is not surprising that upwardly mobile individ-
uals prefer a democratic political order, but without knowing the context where
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individuals live in it is not completely clear what type of political system is in the best inter-
est of socially mobile individuals. If people rise to the top of the social hierarchy or main-
tain their advantageous position within a particular type of society, the experience might
build up strong attachment to the system that provided them with mobility opportunities,
rather than a democratic political regime. So I expected that among upwardly mobile indi-
viduals, support for democracy would be stronger in more democratically developed
societies, while authoritarian rule would be more strongly preferred among the upwardly
mobile individuals in less democratic countries. My findings are broadly in line with this
expectation. Using a multilevel research framework, I showed that, on the one hand, nega-
tive attitudes towards democracy among occupationally downwardly mobile individuals
are stronger in more democratically advanced societies; and, on the other hand, positive
attitudes towards democracy among subjectively upwardly mobile individuals are also
stronger in more democratically advanced societies.
One of the salient issues in studying the links between support for democracy and
objectively attained levels of democracy using cross-national survey data is whether or
not survey respondents are consistently and meaningfully interpreting the concept of
‘democracy’ in different post-socialist countries (Ariely & Davidov, 2011). This might
depend on the respondents’ self-assessment of the character of the regime they live in,
and if there is discrepancy between these subjective views and the objective democracy
measures such as the EIU index of democracy used in the current study. It is known
that in authoritarian states individuals tend to overestimate how democratic their political
systems are (Gerber & Chapman, 2018). On the other hand, respondents in more author-
itarian societies with their strong support for democracy could be expressing a desire for
political change rather than supporting their existing regime. In both instances, the issue
of interpretation is not a major concern for the current study since I am interested in
differences in support for democracy among various mobility groups rather than revealing
if the subjective perception and preference for democracy has the same meaning in differ-
ent political contexts.
Having in mind the limitations of this study, my findings have implications for under-
standing recent trends in democratisation in post-socialist countries. The observation that
in authoritarian states upward intergenerational mobility does not lead to support for
democracy is in line with recent claims that politically repressive countries may provide
their citizens with greater social mobility opportunities (Leventoglu, 2014; Soest & Grau-
vogel, 2016). It should not be surprising then that socially mobile individuals in many
post-socialist societies are less enthusiastic about democracy as the preferred form of pol-
itical order. Interestingly, countries which selected their democratisation paths in the start
of the post-socialist transition largely stayed on their paths as suggested by a strong associ-
ation between democracy index between the first half of the 1990s and the first half of the
2010. In other words, there have not been the major shifts from democracy to authoritar-
ianism, and vice versa. However, over the last few years even the most democratically
advanced countries in this region experienced problems reverting to semi-authoritarian
practices, what has been referred to as ‘backsliding’ of democracy (Greskovits, 2015).
These developments particularly intensified after the major economic crisis in Europe
in the end of 2000s (Armingeon et al., 2016). In this period, steps towards authoritarian-
ism have been primarily facilitated by the more radical political parties’ favourable elec-
toral outcomes and the resultant policy changes. It is known that support for
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democracy, and consequently voting behaviour, can be affected not only by the general
performance of the political system, but also by short-term economic shocks (Cordero
& Simón, 2016). My findings imply that support for democracy can be affected if the
major economic crisis, both in the beginning of the 1990s and in the end of the 2000s,
also affected their perceptions how well they have done in life in comparison to their
parents. In fact, the results of my analysis indicate that in most democratic post-socialist
countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, both occupational downward
mobility and subjective perception of upward mobility are important explanations of sup-
port for democracy. This may suggest that studying socio-economic origins of support for
democracy by means of intergenerational social mobility can be an important tool to
understand the conundrum of democratisation and democratic backsliding in post-social-
ist societies.
Notes
1. Montenegro is excluded from analysis because it was not an independent state when LITS
was initiated, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is excluded because of complicated socio-politi-
cal arrangements. For a more detailed description of EVS and LITS consult reports from
GESIS (2011) and EBRD (2010).
2. To deal with data missingness multiple imputation option is not employed mainly because
only a few control variables are used in regression models.
3. The comparison of 2006 and 2010 waves of LITS suggests that support for democracy
increased in the former Soviet Union countries by 5 percentage points on average, whereas
in EU member societies, including Baltic countries, the share of people who agreed that
democracy is preferable to other political systems declined by about 10 percentage points.
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